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ABSTRACT
This research examines how relative deprivation theory can be applied to study the
success of protest movements and their subsequent impact on the process of democratization of
the South Korean state. This study hopes to provide a more comprehensive approach to how the
role of protests in the development of a democratic state is explained within the field of political
science. Utilizing both a quantitative and qualitative research design, this work applied a case
study analysis as well as a supplemental data analysis regarding the success of Korean protest
movements and their impact on democratization as well as global views of democratization as
previously mentioned. For the case study analysis, I focused on four protest movements in South
Korea and applied relative deprivation theory in each case. Then, I defined five metrics for
protest success based on my previous analysis and used these metrics to conduct a comparative
analysis regarding the short and long term success of each protest movement. For the data
analysis, I utilized Systemic Peace’s Polity Project Series V dataset in order to quantify changes
in the qualities of the regime over time, on a scale ranging from highly authoritarian to highly
democratic regime qualities. Based on this mixed-mode analysis, I find that protest movements
that were linked to progressive deprivation (a form of relative deprivation) led to most successful
shifts towards democratic regime qualities in the long-term. This project is significant to the field
as it will address criticisms in previously discounted protest theory as well as explore the
changing narrative of democratization in the modern world and dispel historical misconceptions
of political culture in East Asia, focusing on Korea.
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INTRODUCTION: MOTIVATIONS & GOALS OF RESEARCH

Here, I will present my initial reasoning for pursuing this thesis topic. While
reading scholarly works on democratization in East Asia and reflecting on discussions in my
Political Science courses, I noted a bias some Western academics hold regarding the
democratization of non-Western states. This bias asserts that East Asian states are inherently
unsuited to Western style democracy as a result of the Confucian value present within East Asian
culture that prioritizes the community over the individual. Knowing what I did about the
remarkably successful democratic transition of South Korea, I decided to study the unique,
historic democratization of South Korea not only to analyze the role of protest movements in
South Korean democratization but also to develop an empirical criticism against such biases ever
present in political science in Western academia. These biases against the success of
democratization in East Asian states fail to take into account the unique style of democracy
which developed in East Asian nations such as South Korea. In the past, democratization in
general was defined by Westerners within in the field of political science, but South Korea has
developed their own style of valid, successful democracy.
This work seeks to highlight the history and development of Korean democracy through
the lens of four key protest movements which contributed to the democratic transition of Korea
and their success as defined by this thesis. I will be analyzing these four protest movements
using relative deprivation theory as posed by Gurr (1970), applying a mixed methodology
involving a qualitative case study analysis as well as a quantitative data analysis. I sincerely hope
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this analytical critique will do its part in the political science community to promote unbiased,
diverse arguments in future academic works on the subject of democratization in East Asia.

2

2

RESEARCH QUESTION & HYPOTHESIS

2.1 Research Question:
How can relative deprivation theory be used to explain the success of protest movements in the
context of their contribution to democratization in South Korea?

2.2 Hypotheses:
The first two hypotheses focus on relative deprivation theory and its relation to both the
number of protest movements and their likelihood to succeed to achieve their goals. Each of
these hypotheses will be explored using a case study analysis four key protest movements within
South Korea.
1) Protest movements occur as a consequence of relative deprivation.
2) When progressive deprivation occurs, protest movements are more likely to be successful
(by the definition within this thesis).
3) Successful protest movements led to the overall greater success of democratization in
Korea.

3
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USING RELATIVE DEPRIVATION THEORY TO EXPLAIN THE ROLE
OF KOREAN PROTEST MOVEMENTS

3.1 An Overview of Relative Deprivation Theory and its Origins
Within this discussion of protest movements in South Korea, it must be understood how
such movements correspond with the overall scholarly discourse of social movements. This
thesis will utilize relative deprivation theory of social movements focusing on the interpretation
by researcher Gurr (1970), in addition to the ideas of Davies (1962) and Morrison (1971). After
presenting an overview of the theory and its key assumptions, a case study analysis will be
presented, connecting the theory to Korean protest movements. I argue that relative deprivation
theory is related to the case of Korean protest movements due to its adherence to the structural
conditions described by Morrison (1971) and the importance of intergroup connections in
Korean society as discussed by Gurr (1970).
The relative deprivation theory of social movements argues that protests are most likely to
take place when a lengthened period of prosperity and development is followed by a sudden shift
in the opposite direction. Because people fear that the progress that they achieved will be
obsolete, their attitudes become more radical. This shift in attitude is the catalyst for revolution
in the form of social movements. According to Gurr (1970), the goal of any regime is to meet the
expectations of the populace in satisfying their needs, which refers to basic resources as well as
sociological needs for democratization and freedoms (Majeed 1979). When a regime fails to
meet this goal, a gap is created between the expectations of the populace and what they are
actually given by the regime, which progressively declines. This effect is what Davies (1962)
refers to as the J-curve, which is named for the graphical shape of the gap between increasing
4

expectations and stagnant reality. According to Davies (1962), it is at this point (when the
populace’s expectations surpass what they receive in reality) that revolution will occur.
Of course, Davies’ and Gurr’s ideas are not referred to as the sole theory of relative
deprivation; but they can be considered a branch of this theory. Earlier versions took on a more
basic interpretation, arguing relative deprivation is the judgement that one or one’s group is less
favored by the regime, creating a sentiment of resentment that leads to revolution. Later scholars
including Davies (1962), Gurr (1970) and Morrison (1971) built upon this basic idea in their
theories.
While Morrison’s interpretation did not include any significant alterations to the theory (as
described by Davies and Gurr) itself, Morrison did point out the weaknesses of previous studies
of the theory. According to Morrison, studies that apply the theory lack direct evidence because
data on the feelings of individuals are often lacking. Additionally, structural conditions that lead
to relative deprivation are rarely considered. Thus, Morrison outlined five structural conditions
relevant to high levels of relative deprivation. The first is a large sector of the population
experiencing the effects of relative deprivation, which creates the base of followers required to
begin a social movement. The second is a community with a high degree of interaction, which
leads to the reinforcement of ideas creating a united ideology. The third is a high degree of class
consciousness, creating awareness about the realistic standing of individuals. The fourth is a
stratification system within society, increasing the likelihood that individuals will recognize their
place within society and seek to change or challenge it. Finally, the fifth is the presence of
voluntary association within society, commonly termed as civil society (Yun 1997). This creates
a basis of organization and leadership within society that are imperative to form successful social
movements (Morrison 1971).
5

Gurr’s theory is significantly similar to Davies’ theory, but the primary difference is as
follows: Both theorists assume the idea that the resentful sentiment that leads to revolution is
created by a gap between expectations and reality. However, Gurr argues that the J-curve theory
is only one possible pattern of relative deprivation which Gurr termed as progressive deprivation;
instead Gurr posits two patterns in addition to progressive deprivation. The first is detrimental
deprivation, in which an individual’s expectations remain stable, but they continue to receive
less. The second is aspirational deprivation, in which expectations rise while achievements
remain stagnant. The third is thus progressive deprivation as explained by Davies (1962).
Additionally, while Davies’ interpretation focused on expectation setting within individuals,
Gurr’s interpretation also accounted for the role of expectation comparison between groups,
which is an additional factor leading to the resentment described within the theory (Majeed
1979).
Thus, as Gurr builds upon the idea of Davies’ J-curve hypothesis, this paper argues that
Gurr’s theory can be considered a more complete view of relative deprivation, as it accounts for
a wider range of patterns within the theory as well as intergroup dynamics that are especially
important in studying an ethnically homogenous but divided society by social class and income
inequality such as South Korea (Chang 2008). Morrison’s structural conditions will additionally
be accounted for within this study, but this paper argues that an additional structural condition
should be considered. That is, some degree of efficacy, or the belief that a situation can be
changed through protest or political action is necessary. If individuals do not believe that their
goals can be achieved through protest, while they may feel the resentment described in the
theory, they will not possess these feelings to the degree required to act upon them. Thus,
efficacy is an additional necessary factor within cases of relative deprivation.
6

3.2 Modern Criticisms of Relative Deprivation
While this study accounted for basic knowledge of the theory and its key assumptions,
equal attention must also be paid to modern interpretations of the theory and its adaptation over
time. This thesis will provide an overview of recent (meaning roughly 21st century) studies that
apply relative deprivation theory to explain the causes of the protest movement. It focuses on its
application to empirical evidence and potential shortcomings of the theory, which this study may
need to consider when developing a research design. This overview will be presented using a
wide range of studies on the theory, not limited to studies on Korea and democratization
movements only.
Recent studies of political struggle, especially studies of political psychology and
sociology, still widely apply relative deprivation theory. However, one criticism commonly
raised in regards to relative deprivation theory is that such studies often lack direct empirical
evidence between the phenomenon that they observe and the theory that they apply (Brush
1996). One such study includes that of whether relative deprivation explains inefficacy within
the US’ Civil Rights Movement, which failed to find a causal mechanism between relative
deprivation and perceptions of inefficacy (Brown, Kettry and Duncan-Shippy 2017). However,
according to Smith and Pettigrew (2015), if relative deprivation is accurately defined using the
right level of analysis, the theory can offer valid insight regarding the formation and nature of
protest movements.
Certainly, evidence found in some studies will not support the theory, as theories propose
explanations for phenomena rather than predicting exact causal mechanisms for such
phenomena. However, this lack of evidence could be due to a wide variety of factors rather than
an abject failure of the theory itself. Within the Civil Rights study mentioned (2017), Brown,
7

Kettry and Duncan-Shippy admit that the likely reason the study failed to find a causal
mechanism is due to the lack of knowledge on mechanisms that produce variation in perceptions
of race-related social change, not an issue with the theory itself. Conversely, one study on
relative deprivation as an explanation for the 2011 Arab Spring did find the gap in expectations
(the aforementioned J-curve) to have been an accurate predictor of the level of destabilization in
Arab nations after the Arab Spring (Korotayev and Shishkina 2020). Additionally, Smith and
Pettigrew (2015) cite seven other examples of studies which did find either causal or correlative
mechanisms explained by relative deprivation theory.
The intent of this section on relative deprivation is not to simply name “successful” or
“valid” (meaning studies that found mechanisms explained by relative deprivation, although the
term “success” is somewhat meaningless pertaining to research results) studies based on the
theory. Rather, the point this study hopes to make is this: It should be acknowledged that looking
at the theory’s history, relative deprivation studies can admittedly fail to find direct evidence
pointing to causal relationships. However, criticisms of the theory can in fact be addressed if two
precautions are taken, which are as follows.
The first is making sure to use the proper level of analysis, which in Gurr’s (1970) case
refers to accounting for both individual and intergroup explanations. According to Smith and
Pettigrew (2015), studies using both levels of analysis provide a more comprehensive
understanding of explanations for protest movements in terms of factoring for variation. For
instance, the role of culture can serve as a source of variation in studying the mechanisms of
protest movements when measured using collective identity, which will be discussed later in this
study. Within this study’s focus on South Korea, accounting for both individual and group-based
relative deprivation is especially imperative. Collective identity is an important facet of Korean
8

political culture, and individual attitudes are vital when analyzing democratization and protest
movements, especially as this study utilizes Gurr’s (1970) interpretation of relative deprivation.
The second is applying the theory under the lens of wider theoretical models, by
considering factors beyond the theory itself, such as collective identity and efficacy (social
impact theory). For example, the aforementioned study on destabilization after the Arab Spring
focused on relative deprivation under the broader scope of scholarly knowledge on
destabilization as a whole (Korotayev and Shishkina 2020). Within this study, the
aforementioned structural conditions termed by Morrison (1971) will account for this
precautionary measure. This thesis’ application of the structural conditions by Morrison (1971)
can be found in Table 2.

3.3 Relative Deprivation and Its Application to Korean Protest Movements
In the next sections of this thesis, relative deprivation theory will be applied to specific
cases of Korean protest movements. Particular attention will be paid to comparing the nature and
outcomes of protest movements before and after Korean democratization that occurred in 1998
with the election of Kim Dae-Jung. See Table 1 for an organized, brief description of each
movement, and Table 2 for the application of each movement to Morrison’s (1971) structural
conditions.
3.3.1 April Revolution, 1960 (Pre-democratization)
The April Revolution was the largest mass protest in South Korea since the end of
Japanese occupation in 1945. This protest movement eventually led to the resignation and exile
of Korea’s first President Rhee Syng-Man (Shin 2020). The event triggering the protest is
officially labeled as the discovery of the body of high school student activist Kim Ju-Yul. Kim
9

Ju-Yul died due to a close-range grenade thrown by military forces during riots protesting rigged
election results favoring the re-election of Rhee Syng-Man. As news of the body’s discovery
broke, Rhee Syng-Man and his followers attempted to censor the news and blamed the riots on a
larger Communist conspiracy, angering activists (Yang 1973). However, the specific conditions
which led to the April Revolution and Rhee Syng-Man’s eventual downfall are evidently more
complex than just this event, which will be discussed in this section.
First, attention should be directed towards Rhee Syng-Man’s background. Rhee SyngMan became the first Korean President not by the Korean populace or even by any Korean
decision-making body, but by the United States government (an election did take place, but it is
widely regarded as rigged). Rhee Syng-Man attended American schools throughout his overall
education and served in several positions as a representative of Korean affairs to the US and
Western powers. US leaders selected Rhee Syng-Man to support as the first president due to his
ability to fluently converse in English with the United States Army Military Government in
Korea (USAMGIK), who presided over Korea from 1945 to 1948 after Japanese occupation
ended (Hwang 2001). Thus, Rhee Syng-Man’s background could be considered more of the
choice of American than that of Korean (Lee 2015). Rhee Syng-Man’s American background
heavily reflected on his actions as a decisionmaker adopting an extremely pro-US and antiCommunist stance in nearly all aspects of his policies (Hwang 2001).
Additional points of note regarding Rhee Syng-Man are that along with his strong
American influence, his leadership style quickly took on a more authoritarian shape (Shin 2020).
Rhee Syng-Man suppressed dissent from political opponents, most notably ordering the
assassination of opposition figure Kim Gu. Kim Gu was shot by one of Rhee Syng-Man’s
lieutenants in his home in 1949, with the assassination being justified by regime-fabricated
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Communist links to Kim Gu. Rhee Syng-Man also suppressed anti-regime protests to a large
degree, such as his violent subduing of the Jeju Uprising (1948-1949), which reported a death
toll of over 14,000. Jeju Island possesses a history of colonial resistance to Japanese
authoritarianism, and thus became a force against the new authoritarian power of Rhee SyngMan. Rhee Syng-Man again justified this suppression by arguing the protestors were
Communists.
Rhee Syng-Man’s US education and US influence meant that he often acted as a puppet
for US interests and not as a leader or provider for the common people in Korea. During Rhee
Syng-Man’s regime (1948-1960), higher education institutes increased dramatically, going from
only 19 in 1945 to 189 in 1960, a near 995% increase (Yang 1973). As more students entered
higher education, they entered the ideal breeding ground to develop revolutionary mindsets as
well as learn valuable skills of organization and group cooperation (Shin 2020). Both of these
factors contributed to the development of an influential, solidified civil society within the student
population, a key factor in the general success of revolutions (Yun 1997). Due to Rhee SyngMan’s influence from the US, American socio-political ideals of democracy, fundamental rights
and empowerment of the common people became mainstays within Korean higher education
curriculum, later contributing to the April Revolution. (Yang 1973).
Additionally, the upbringing of these students must be considered. If one assumes their
ages entering higher education to be 18 (international age), university and high school students
during this time (1948-1960) would have been born roughly between 1928 and 1942. Thus, some
of these students would have remembered the Korean revolutionary efforts against the Japanese
rule from 1910 to 1945, perhaps even taking part in some of these efforts themselves, or hearing
about these efforts from parents or other close figures. Remembering this revolutionary legacy
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and its importance allowed students to connect their democratic education along with direct
examples of successful protest movements (Yang 1973). I make the argument within this thesis
that this generational aspect of Korean political culture, particularly relating to protest culture, is
that which makes Korea’s democratization so unique from other democratized societies. The
Korean revolutionary legacy of protest, primarily by students, as an aid to achieve not only
democratization but also freedoms as a whole is a central aspect of what has allowed Korea to be
so successful today. During the April Revolution as well as the other case studies analyzed in
this thesis, this revolutionary legacy exacerbated feelings of relative deprivation which led to
students to eventually unite in protest (Yang 1973).
This democratic education along with the reminiscence of Korea’s revolutionary tradition
led to the continual building of the students’ expectations for such democratic ideals within their
own government (Choi 1991). Additionally, the experience of liberation from autocratic
Japanese rule set high expectations for the new, democratic era of Korean leadership by this new
President, Rhee Syng-Man. However, what the students received from their leaders in reality was
a far cry from what these students expected throughout their education. Events such as the Jeju
Uprising and Kim Gu’s assassination along with Rhee Syng-Man’s generally autocratic behavior
(such as removing the two-term constitutional limit on Presidency in 1956) revealed a leader
much removed from the democratic, heroic leader they imagined (Yang 1973). Economic growth
was also slow during Rhee Syng-Man’s rule, and thus the populace experienced little
development on most front (economically, socially and politically).
An additional factor contributing to relative deprivation involved in the April Revolution
was the Korean War (1950-1953). The Korean War began with the invasion of South Korea by
the Communist North Korean regime, with the US military also getting involved to stop South
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Korea from falling to the Communist threat. The war had a devastating effect on the peninsula,
with three million dead, missing or wounded and over 10 million families (a third of the
population) separated by the war (Koh 1993). The war ended with the signing of an armistice
agreement by the North and South Korean governments along with the US government. Rhee
Syng-Man opposed the signing of this agreement, hoping to unite the two Koreas by force and
continue the war. This public opposition of the agreement was highly unfavorable to the Korean
populace. The populace sacrificed their and their family’s lives for the war, and Rhee SyngMan’s wishes to continue the war rather than work toward peace was seen as unpopular and a
decision which could be made only from a privileged position. In a way, Rhee Syng-Man
favored the interests of the US and Communist-opposers over those of his own people. The war
additionally crippled the South Korean economy, with the amount of property damage equaling
South Korea’s GNP in 1949 (Koh 1993). Rhee Syng-Man expressed a clear disregard for the
sacrifices of the populace during and after the war along with the overall instability the war
created. This disregard contributed to the frustration students and revolutionary groups felt
during Rhee Syng-Man’s regime.
All of these factors led to high yet unrecognized expectations creating a deep emotional
sense of frustration within the student community in response to this constant failure of the
regime to deliver on expectations. These constantly high expectations of the populace paired
with rapidly lowering capabilities of the regime to grant the populace are consistent with Gurr’s
(1970) concept of decremental deprivation, in which expectations are constant but capabilities to
provide decrease. While the populace, students especially, had high expectations for a heroic,
democratic leader after years of mistreatment and repression under Japanese rule, Rhee SyngMan’s regime failed to meet these expectations. Thus, when students found fellow protestor Kim
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Ju-Yul’s body, they found a catalyst for a larger scale protest movement like the April
Revolution to take place.
3.3.2 Gwangju Uprising, 1980 (Pre-Democratization)
This section marks the second installment of this research’s overall analysis of Korean
protest movements and how relative deprivation theory can be applied to such protest
movements. This section will center attention on the 1980 Gwangju Massacre along with the set
of circumstances that led to the uprising and how it applies to the theory.
To accurately “set the scene” of the Gwangju Massacre, attention should be focused on
the previous decade before discussing the actual protest movement. After the ousting of
President Rhee Syng-Man in 1960, a power vacuum existed for a short time in the Korean
government. While the short-lived Second Republic attempted to fill this vacuum by
experimenting with a parliamentary system, the lack of stable leadership created disorder and
uncertainty. Thus, in 1961 a military coup led to the overthrow of the Second Republic and the
establishment of the Third Republic, headed by general Park Chung-Hee (Han 2004). Park
Chung-Hee maintained the office of President for the next 17 years until his assassination in
1979, ruling the country in an authoritarian and uncompromising manner. Park Chung-Hee
limited the press, freedom of assembly and the ability to oppose the regime in nearly any way,
effectively crushing any possible dissent (Yun 1997).
While one may assume that Park’s leadership style might be viewed as unpopular,
autocratic by the Korean populace, the reality was quite the opposite. Although Park Chung-Hee
was certainly an authoritarian leader by Western standards, Park Chung-Hee’s charisma to
appeal to the Korean populace made his leadership style permissible and even welcomed by the
people. Unlike Rhee Syng-Man who was somewhat elitist with American background, Park
14

Chung-Hee emerged from humble beginnings, working his way up the ladder of Korean politics
with his military skill. Park Chung-Hee’s origins reflected in his ideology as a leader, as Park
Chung-Hee strongly supported populist ideals such as anti-elitism and egalitarianism (Han
2004).
The support of such ideals made Park Chung-Hee incredibly popular no matter the
limiting of social and political freedoms due to the socio-economic situation of South Korea at
the time. The combination of the steep increase in higher education institutes along with the
financial ruin of the nation after the Korean War and Rhee Syng-Man’s economic decision
making led to an increasing urban-rural economic imbalance (Yang 1973). This imbalance
created frustration for those living in rural areas who did not have the chance to capitalize on the
education opportunities of the urban population.
Thus, the bolstering of ideals such as anti-elitism and egalitarianism was extremely
popular with the frustrated rural population. The democratic implication of these ideals also led
to their popularity within the educated urban population (which had just led a democratic
revolution). Additionally, Park Chung-Hee utilized heavy nationalism and anti-Americanism in
his ideological appeal to Korean population, contrasting to Rhee Syng-Man. Not only was Park
Chung-Hee able to gain the favor of the populace through his ideology and charisma, but Park
Chung-Hee’s actual policies were successful as well, with the most famous and successful being
the New Community Movement that helped to bring South Korea to the elevated economic
position it still enjoys today (Han 2004). Park Chung-Hee is often accredited with restoring
Korean economic growth after the disastrous impact of the Korean War, modernizing South
Korea at a remarkably fast pace, with GDP per capita’s growth rate rising from -40% in 1961 to
nearly 23% in 1969.
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After Park Chung-Hee’s death in 1979, his successor, Chun Doo-Hwan, was far less
popular. Like Park Chung-Hee, Chun Doo-Hwan came from humble beginnings, worked his way
up as a military leader, and was able to become President through the use of a military coup.
However, Chun Doo-Hwan was already viewed an a less effective leader even before he came to
power. As the successor to someone as beloved and well-regarded as Park Chung-Hee, meeting
the expectations set by Park Chung-Hee would have been nearly impossible-and Chun DooHwan was not up to the task. Although the two leaders shared similar origins, Chun Doo-Hwan
lacked the support and charisma of Park Chung-Hee (Han 2004).
Rather than gaining power through the willingness of the people, Chun Doo-Hwan’s
source of power came from his military association, namely his leadership of an exclusive
military alliance known as the Hanahoe. Through the Hanahoe, Chun Doo-Hwan succeeded in
his complete government takeover by purging the old generals and creating a party that would
specifically serve the Hanahoe’s political interests, the Democratic Justice Party (Moon and
Rhyu 2013). Chun Doo-Hwan’s tight grasp on the military meant that the military became the
primary enforcer of government policy rather than actual public reverence for Chun Doo-Hwan.
Thus, Chun Doo-Hwan’s regime lacked legitimacy as he overly relied on hard power to enforce
his ideas rather than soft power. Although Park Chung-Hee also utilized military power to crush
dissent, his strong sense of legitimacy and support meant that suppressing opposition was
justified to the public. Park Chung-Hee also possessed a strong anti-Communist association and
a sense of public sympathy after an assassination attempt on the President led to the death of his
wife, all things that served to bolster his popularity. Under Chun Doo-Hwan, such suppression
was not tolerated due to his lack of personal charisma and sense of personal touch with the
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public (Kim 2011). The discrepancy between support of the two leaders only served to
exacerbate the frustration of the populace.
Additionally, the way Park Chung-Hee’s regime ended also contributed to Chun DooHwan’s lack of legitimacy and respect from the public. Park Chung-Hee was assassinated by the
leader of the KCIA in an event which shocked the nation. While Park Chung-Hee did become
slightly less popular in later years due to his authoritarian behavior (such as the Yushin
Constitution that outlawed opposition activity), he was still remembered as the leader who
brought Korea out of the devastation of Rhee Syng-Man’s rule and the Korean War (Han 2004).
This served to deepen the unfavorable comparison between Park Chung-Hee and Chun DooHwan. The abrupt end of the regime with Park Chung-Hee’s assassination created political and
social instability, which allowed Chun Doo-Hwan’s coup to succeed but also gave way to the
growth of opposition movements (Choi 1991).
The aforementioned revolutionary legacy of the Korean state after numerous social
movements such as that against the Japanese colonial rule and the April Revolution only 20
years earlier in 1960 also contributed to feelings of relative deprivation which led to the
Gwangju Uprising. According to Abramson and Inglehart (1986), generational replacement, or
the argument that the experiences accumulated by generations and the subsequent replacement of
those generations by younger generations is a key factor in value shifts within societies. While
their study focused on Europe and the West, I believe that a somewhat similar sentiment can be
applied to the case of Korean democratization. This revolutionary legacy originating with the
parents and grandparents of 1980s teenagers and young adults fighting against Japanese rule and
Rhee Syng-Man’s regime reinforced the feelings of relative deprivation felt by Gwangju students
as they could look back on the successes of their forefathers as a source of inspiration to fight
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against the repression they felt under Chun Doo-Hwan’s lacking rule. As argued by Abramson
and Inglehart (1986), generational value shifts are often related to the differences in life
experiences between past and present generations. In the case of South Korea, the clear
similarities in the life experiences, those of revolution and protest against political oppression, of
the generations in 1940s, 1960s and now 1980s Korea led to the reinforcement of these
revolutionary values in each subsequent generation. Each subsequent generation became more
and more revolutionary based on their experiences and those of their forefathers, and as this
generational “reinforcement” rather than a generational replacement as termed by Abramson and
Inglehart (1986) continued to occur, the greater success of protest movements is seen with the
cases of the June Struggle (1987) and Candlelight Revolution (2017) (see Section 4.1.1).
This lack of political legitimacy combined with the instability that Park Chung-Hee’s
assassination left behind led to the ideal conditions for an uprising during Chun’s regime. Yet,
the direct catalyst to the Gwangju Massacre was the jailing of opposition leader Kim Dae-Jung,
who was native to Gwangju province (Chung 2003). Chun Doo-Hwan imposed martial law in
the name of “security” against anti-government uprisings, furthering his unpopularity and
frustrating the populace due to constant military presence in their homes (Moon and Rhyu 2013).
As the name implies, the revolution in Gwangju was brutally suppressed by Chun Doo-Hwan’s
forces, with the military going so far as to use bayonets and sexually assaulting protestors (Kim
2011). Although the struggle lasted for ten days, the protestors eventually had to give in to the
power of the military.
Applying the situation of the Gwangju Massacre to relative deprivation theory, the
Gwangju Massacre can be explained by decremental deprivation as outlined by Gurr (1970), in
which expectations for the regime’s success remain constant while the capability of the regime to
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deliver on these expectations decreases. While the developmental success of Park Chung-Hee’s
regime may have led to heightened expectations for continued economic prosperity, considering
the highly authoritarian nature of Park Chung-Hee’s rule and the similarly autocratic way Chun
Doo-Hwan came into power, expectations for a more democratic regime clearly did not increase.
Due to the authoritarian nature of Chun Doo-Hwan combined with his lack of charisma and
ability as a political leader, the capabilities of the regime to deliver on those expectations
continued to stagnate with the imposition of martial law and the jailing of Kim Dae-Jung. Thus,
expectations stagnated while the capabilities of the regime decreased.
For the purposes of this study, it will be helpful to include a short discussion on the
varying degrees of success of the April Revolution and the Gwangju Massacre. While both were
ignited by a reaction to authoritarian behavior of incumbent leaders, the April Revolution was
able to spread to nearly the entire Korean peninsula, while the Gwangju uprising was confined to
Gwangju province. Due to the brutality of the massacre, even if civilians in other provinces
supported the uprising, it was far too dangerous to express any favor towards the protestors, and
as Chun Doo-Hwan’s forces successfully closed off the city, the possibility of any protest aid
was crushed. Furthermore, when one looks at the timeline of the two protest movements, the
April Revolution was nearly twelve years in the making (Rhee Syng-Man’s regime lasted from
1948-1960), allowing organization to take place and frustrations to grow gradually. Conversely,
the Gwangju uprising was far more abrupt in nature, with Chun Doo-Hwan ruling for less than a
year when the event occurred. Thus, the Gwangju protestors were far less organized than the
April protestors, impeding the potential success of the revolution (Na 2003). Infighting between
protest alliances was also common during the Gwangju Uprising, making it difficult to mount a
united protest movement with a clear goal such as the April Revolution (Choi 1991).

19

3.3.3 June Struggle, 1987 (During democratization)
It is important to understand the background of the June Struggle how frustrations against
the regime came to the point of political protest. As the Korean populace came to know the
realities of the Gwangju Massacre and the government’s role, Chun Doo-Hwan’s regime lost a
great deal of trust and support from the populace. The brutal suppression of opposers led to an
overall feeling of melancholy and discontent, as the people began to lose hope for democratic
governance. (Lee 2000). This forced Chun Doo-Hwan to rule using coercion rather than the
actual support of the people. However, Chun Doo-Hwan also utilized appeasement to a certain
degree, such as allowing students who were expelled due to participating in protest activities to
return to school. Thus, Chun Doo-Hwan’s inconsistent policies created a sense of weakness in
his leadership style among the populace despite the brutality he showed in the Gwangju
Massacre. Chun Doo-Hwan’s lacking ability to choose between coercive or appeasing methods
in dealing with opposers had a democratizing effect, giving leeway for the growth of democratic
organization and institution-building within civil society (Jung and Kim, 2020).
While there was a degree of democratic group consolidation during the Gwangju
Uprising, such as the Mulim and Haklim, these groups consisted of only students prior to the
1980s. Additionally, because these groups often disagreed with one another over protest tactics
and possessed little organization, they often failed to succeed in their endeavors (Choi 1991).
The tragedy of the Gwangju Massacre along with Chun Doo-Hwan’s discrepant policy choices
served to unite these previously opposed groups. Particularly, democratic groups united under
the minjung, or people’s ideology, focusing on grassroots strategies and group consolidation
rather than actual protest movements (Chung 2003). A tactical shift occurred in which protest
groups concentrated on reaching out to groups outside of purely students (Choi 1991).
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The students specifically focused on the working class, as it had the largest number of
people. Protestors looked for jobs within factories and working-class areas in order to get closer
to the laborers by working alongside them. Protest groups reached out to the working class by
educating laborers through “night school” and providing them resources to connect with
democratic groups (Yun 1997). Prior to the connection of the students and working class, the
working class stayed out of political issues as their primary goal was feeding their families and
making a living. This education and connection led to laborers feeling strongly enough about
democratization to form movements of their own. One such movement was the 1985 Kuro
Alliance Strike in which labor unions joined with student activists in a strike, which led to
thousands of workers losing their jobs (Yun 1997). Thus, by connecting multiple sectors of
society, those who opposed the regime could more efficiently unite the populace, rather than
relying on students (Choi 1991).
During the post Gwangju Massacre from 1980 to 1987, various organizations came
together to end Chun Doo-Hwan’s regime. One such group known as the Mintongryun (United
Minjung People’s) Movement for Democracy and Reunification, or the UMMDU, united
students and the working class (Yun 1997). Prior to the Gwangju Massacre, these groups rarely
possessed concrete planning and resources. The UMMDU rectified this mistake in two ways.
First, while previous protests were organized and occurred primarily in cities, the UMMDU set
up regional branches to spread their message to a broader audience, which brought in the rural
populace. Second, the UMMDU created a common, concrete agenda of goals and mission
statements to spread across each province in order to consolidate and organize their goals (Yun
1997).
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Arguably the most important tactical change was the shift in the mission of the opposition
groups. Previously, opposition groups did not hold a concrete goal. Rather, their goals were often
split between working against the authoritarian domestic regime and working against US
imperialism. The people questioned whether the real enemy was the regime itself or the
imperialist powers which upheld it. While it was certainly accurate that US imperialism
contributed to the regime, activists examined how their message could more easily reach the
general public, namely the middle class. These activists realized that while the middle class
shared their concerns about democracy, they did not possess the same negative feelings towards
the US and foreign powers. Thus, the activists shifted their agendas to focus on the common goal
of democracy rather than the less organized, less easily achieved goal of also ending US
imperialism (Shorrock 1988). The changing tactics and organization of groups led to greater
success in their goal of democratic elections.
Chun Doo-Hwan’s seven-year term as President came to an end in 1987. He announced
his chosen successor as fellow Hanahoe member Roh Tae-Woo, stating the election would occur
in a similar manner to Chun Doo-Hwan’s “election” in 1980. Essentially, this selection by Chun
Doo-Hwan secured Roh Tae-Woo’s succession as President due to Chun Doo-Hwan’s complete
control over the Electoral College (Chung 2003). Chun Doo-Hwan made a spectacle of his
selection, presiding over a televised “election” of Roh Tae-Woo and shaking his hand, smiling.
At this point (1987) an amendment which would have the President directly elected achieved
popular support from the populace, so this display of arrogance and flashiness enraged the public
(Shorrock 1988). Opposition party members in the National Assembly thereby demanded an
amendment for a popular vote. One additional aspect to note is that opposition parties began to
gain footing during this period due to the charisma and leadership of two future Presidents, Kim
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Dae-Jung and Kim Young-Sam. The presence of representative oppositions leaders allowed
protestors to unify even more, as they now had figureheads to attach their ideology to (Yun
1997).
The demand for such an amendment acted as the catalyst for the June Struggle to occur,
along with the reveal of the torture and death of a student protestor, Kim Jong-Cheol by the
regime. The UMMDU along with several other democratic groups organized a coalition, known
as the National Coalition for a Democratic Constitution, or NCDC. Learning from the tragedy at
Gwangju, the NCDC employed peaceful tactics to avoid regime retaliation, the most famous
being the People’s March where over one million people participated in a peaceful march
through 34 cities on June 26th 1987 (Yun 1997). Additionally, when examining how to get the
public (namely the middle class) involved, activists recognized that the middle class was put off
by violent movements. Therefore, tactics shifted to more peaceful, organized measures (Shorrock
1988). The regime now had a choice as to respond with force or concede to the protestors.
Seeing a physical manifestation of his unpopularity and lack of support, as well as taking into
account that his previous attempts at forcible suppression of opposition clearly failed, Chun DooHwan made the latter decision. On June 29th, the regime finally conceded to the protestor’s
demands and issued the June 29th Declaration that laid out an eight-point plan to move towards
democratization. While Roh Tae-Woo still won in the eventual presidential election due to the
opposition vote between Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Young-Sam being split, the Declaration was
the first official step towards democratization.
The events of the June struggle can be explained by Gurr’s (1970) and Davies’ (1962)
concept of progressive deprivation. Expectations began to stagnate as Chun Doo-Hwan’s
unpopularity grew, but then expectations steadily increased as opposition movements and leaders
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rose in prominence, creating an expectation for democratization in the near future. During this
time, regime capabilities continued to decrease. When the regime continually failed to deliver on
the democratic expectations of the people, the people’s frustrations ignited into an organized,
effective movement.
3.3.4 Candlelight Revolution and the Removal of President Park Geun-Hye (Postdemocratization, 2016-2017)
A quick spotlight on the background of the protest movement will be given here. In 2016,
media sources revealed President Park Geun-Hye knowingly allowed her aide and close friend,
Choi Soon-Sil to use her political position to obtain donations from Korean conglomerates
(chaebols). Allowing her aide to leverage her position in exchange for support from the chaebols
led to a massive corruption scandal. Additionally, in 2014 the tragic Sewol Ferry sinking
occurred, leaving hundreds of high school students dead. After the sinking, media reports
revealed that Park Geun-Hye’s government attempted to cover up the actual extent and cause of
the event in a hope to save face, hurting the reputation of the Park regime (Yap 2015).
President Park Geun-Hye is the daughter of President Park Chung-Hee, whose popular
legacy initially helped elevate Park Geun-Hye’s political status. However, like Park ChungHee’s successors it was soon revealed that Park Geun-Hye also lacked the charisma of her father,
and was out of touch with the populace, as seen with her response to the Sewol crisis (Turner,
Kwon and O’Donnell 2018). As the corruption scandal loomed, Park Geun-Hye apologized only
through her lawyers and refused to attend impeachment hearings. It was also revealed by the
press that the Park administration created a blacklist to target critics of the regime, reminding the
public of the tactics of her father. Authoritarianism was permissible to the populace in the 1970s
due to the need for rapid economic growth as well as Park Chung-Hee’s personal charisma. In
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the post-democratic age, such attempts at authoritarianism combined with clear abuses of power
were unforgivable to the more critical, hardened Korean public.
It will be helpful to include a short discussion on the differences between predemocratization protests and post-democratization protests in Korea, to demonstrate the effect of
democratization on protest tactics and building. The Candlelight Protests were one of the largest
protest efforts in Korean history, with the cumulative number of participants reported as 10
million (Seo 2020). The Candlelight Protests were also extremely peaceful consisting primarily
of marches with protestors holding lit candles, a Korean symbol of justice in comparison to
previous movements that occurred in pre-democratic Korean era (Kim 2017). Similar to previous
movements, the Candlelight Protests did originate with student activism, as students at Ewha
Women’s University questioned the admission of Choi Soon-Sil’s daughter without proper
qualifications. However, as the protests continued, the largest portion of protestors came to be
the middle class (Delury 2017). The middle class of the 2010s were the same students who had
protested authoritarianism in the 1980s and 1990s. This gave these students a legacy of protest
traditions which led them to do the same during the Candlelight Protests. Thus, in the postdemocratic era a larger sector of the populace felt emboldened to participate, signifying the
transition to a more democratic state. Additionally, as these protests occurred in the postdemocratization era, the populace no longer feared violent retribution once faced in the late
1900s. Even families participated, pushing strollers in one hand and carrying candles or signs in
another (Delury 2017). According to Turner, Kwon and O’Donnell (2018), the consistent role of
protests in Korea’s democratization process made protests a typical, almost routine democratic
tradition in Korea.
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A key factor that aided in the success of the Candlelight Protests, which was not present
during pre-democratization protests, was the freedom of news media. Progressive media outlet
Hankyoreh and the Samsung-affiliated JTBC Newsroom first broke the scandal’s story. Notably,
since Samsung was one of the chaebols accused of accepting political favors from Choi SoonSil, JTBC’s choice to break the story seems odd and bold. In the years following JTBTC’s
creation by Samsung-affiliated conservative newspaper Joong-Ang in 2011, JTBC’s growth was
initially slow. However, after the network acquired shrewd MBC journalist Sohn Suk-Hee as
CEO in 2013, Sohn demanded editorial independence for the network to meet his demands of
high quality journalism. The network began to focus on bringing in public ratings in order to
boost business growth, which tended to mean more progressive and shocking journalism.
Although the initial reason for the shift was to bring in ratings, this shrewd change contributed to
democratic development by focusing on investigative, hard-hitting journalism. JTBC’s critical
coverage of the Sewol Ferry sinking was a key contributor to its reputation as an investigative
network (Seo 2020). By making a larger sector of the populace aware of the deprivation, the free
press aided in the democratic movement, according to Morrison (1971).
An additional, new factor in these protests was social media, which allowed protest
campaigns and organizational information to quickly flow through protest networks (Yun and
Min 2020). The primary organization involved in the protest, the Emergency Citizen Action for
the Park Geun-Hye Administration’s Resignation (ECAPAR), was able to gather 1,500 civic
groups using social media strategies to put more pressure on the National Assembly. While
Park’s Saenuri Party members at first supported the President, as Park’s approval rating fell to
4% it was clear that supporting her would danger their chances of reelection (Turner, Kwon and
O’Donnell 2018). Park was impeached by a 78% of votes in the National Assembly in December
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of 2016, with the decision upheld by an 8-0 court decision in March of 2017. Park, along with
Choi Soon-Sil and 20 other regime members, were later arrested and jailed for corruption and
abuse of power charges (Turner, Kwon and O’Donnell 2018).
Scholars such as Turner, Kwon and O’Donnell (2018) and Yap (2014) argue that the
events of the Park administration such as the Sewol Ferry crisis and the impeachment reveal a
country which has not fully democratized. However, this thesis makes the alternative argument.
The leadership of Park Geun-Hye can certainly be considered a failure, regarding her response to
Sewol Ferry and her corruption issues. However, it was not a failure of the democratic process.
Park Geun-Hye was still democratically elected to the office of President, and she was peacefully
removed from that office due to the work of protestors and the free media. The removal of Park
can be considered a testament to the fact that Korea did undergo a successful democratic
transition, as the impeachment followed democratic processes and ultimately the will of the
populace. Thus, the protests did achieve a constructive commitment to the quality of democracy
by pressuring governmental institutions to uphold the due process (Kim 2017). A commitment to
a democratic system does not mean that corrupt leaders like Park will never come into power or
commit such wrongdoings as she had. Rather, an accountable democratic system will safeguard
against abuses of such power and ensure that those who do abuse power are brought to justice, as
Park faced.
With the cases of the Candlelight Revolution as well as the June Struggle (1987), the
long-term effects of the “generational reinforcement” discussed in Section 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 can be
clearly seen. Both movements, especially the Candlelight Revolution when compared to the
earlier April Revolution (1960) and Gwangju Massacre (1980) experienced clear successes for
democratization and a wider scale of involvement of numerous social sectors, alliances and
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organization. The reinforcement of the revolutionary legacy set forth by the forefathers of past
social movements in Korea led to the development of similarly minded democratic values and
thus a democratic political culture built on protest and the accountability of the government. I
argue that this generational reinforcement of democratic values rooted in protest is the primary
aspect which makes Korean democracy and society uniquely predisposed to a culture of protest,
allowing the democratic transition of South Korea to continue succeeding and thriving as time
moves on and generational reinforcement continues to occur.
The circumstances of the Candlelight Revolution can be applied to Gurr’s (1970) relative
deprivation theory through the concept of progressive deprivation, or Davies’ (1962) J-curve. As
the democratic transition took place, the populace came to consistently increase their
expectations for democratic, accountable political leadership. At the same time, the capabilities
of the Park regime to deliver on those expectations declined with the Sewol and corruption
scandals, and Park’s overall failure to appeal to the will of the people. Thus, a J-curve is formed
with a gap between expectations and capabilities.
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4

WHAT MAKES A SUCCESSFUL PROTEST MOVEMENT?

4.1 Five Metrics for Defining Protest Success
This thesis defines a set of five metrics for what components a successful protest tends to
include:
1) Goals are explicitly defined and agreed upon in a unified manner by the movement’s
participants.
2) Primary goal of the protest is directly met and produces meaningful effect(s) in the
timespan following the protest.
3) Possesses a clear, inclusive organization of the protest by groups involved (collaboration
of inequality).
4) A meaningful portion of the population participates in the protest (strength in numbers).
5) The protest displays the precursive qualities which this thesis defines as progressive
relative deprivation (Hypothesis 2).
Since protest goals are the most important aspect of protest success, as shown in the
simple definition from earlier, the first two metrics discuss goals. First, explicit definition of
protest goals must be established for organizational purposes, as participants cannot have their
goals met if what their goals are is unclear to the government (Biggs and Andrews 2015).
Agreeing upon protest goals among different segments of the participants is equally important.
According to Wouters and Walgrave (2017), it is the most persuasive factor in terms of
convincing political elites or representatives to deliver on the protest participants’ demands. The
reason for why unity is so convincing is twofold. First, unified goals produce a clearer message
that can then be interpreted more easily by the government. Second, a unified message gives the
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impression of a solidity among protesters, making the government sees protest demands as
legitimate and thus important to address in order to garner support for the government (Wouters
and Walgrave 2017).
Instead of deciding upon protest success based on whether a certain number of goals were
met, this thesis argues that it is more parsimonious to determine success based on whether the
primary goal was met. The primary goal in each case study can simply be considered some shift
towards democratization, or any move towards a Polity score of 8, as democratization is the
dependent variable in this thesis. However, note that each case possesses a certain degree of
nuance within that label. For example, the April Revolution (1960), Gwangju Uprising (1980)
and the June Struggle (1987) all possessed the primary goal of forming a democratic government
ultimately. In the case of the Candlelight Revolution (2017), while a democratic system was
already in place, the movement to remove Park Geun-Hye is characteristic of democratization as
it focused on the peaceful removal of an elected leader (Kim 2020). Thus, using the primary goal
of democratic trends shifts will simplify measurement while still adequately addressing the
overall focus of this thesis, the democratic process.
Additionally, the goal must be directly met, meaning that the protestors’ goal should be
clearly addressed in a manner favorable to the protestors’ demands. Finally, the goal being met
must produce some meaningful effects in the years following the protest. For example, while the
April Revolution (1960) did succeed in removing Rhee Syng-Man and installing a rudimentary
parliamentary system, the system was installed for only a year before Park Chung-Hee’s
takeover. Thus, it could barely be considered anything more than an experiment with democracy
(Han 2004). Thus, while the goal was directly met, it did not produce a meaningful, lasting effect
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in creating a democratic system, with the continued success of a different authoritarian leader
only a year after.
A clear, inclusive protest organization by groups is imperative to protest success, as it
contributes to a unified message as mentioned in metric one (Wouters and Walgrave 2017). A
concise organization yields a key precursor to protest development, such as education, or more
simply the ability to easily deliver information regarding protest motivations and tactics to
spread them to a wider portion of the population (Hussain and Howard 2013). This metric is
especially important to consider when analyzing a case study such as that of South Korea, where
civil society and alliance formation played a massive role in nearly all major democratic
movements (Chang 2008).
Another force for protest success in the case of South Korea was an inclusive and diverse
base of support for protest movements. Particularly looking at the case of the June Struggle
(1987), the inclusion of workers and farmers beyond just students (which was the primary protest
group in previous case studies) created a shift in protest strategy that later led to the movement’s
success in creating democratic elections (Yun 1997). This component reflects the idea of the
collaboration of inequality, allowing diverse groups to come together in an understanding of
each’s unequal treatment by the regime, and lead them to act upon their concerns in an organized
manner. Thus, successful movements are not only limited to one social group, but rather a
unique, diverse set of multiple social groups coming together to create a unified agenda (Wouters
and Walgrave 2017).
Explaining the fourth metric, successful protests tend to possess a sizable participation
rate from diverse sections of the population. Along with unity of protest goals as previously
mentioned, the sheer size of a protest movement plays a significant role in persuading political
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elites or leaders to listen to and act on the demands of protesters (Wouters and Walgrave 2017).
The reason for this influential role is simple: large numbers give political elites a sense of how
much broad support the movement possesses in the scope of the general public. Thus, political
authorities are more likely to respond to protesters’ demands (Biggs and Andrews 2015).
Additionally, the metric mentions the importance of diverse sections of the population,
similarly to metric 3. However, metric 3 refers more so to social groups such as varying social
classes participating in movements. Metric 4’s focus on diversity centers on the geographic
inclusion of varying regional groups partaking in the protests. In the case of South Korea,
regionalism and loyalty to one’s region are prevalent due to Korea’s homogenous ethnic
structure (Chang 2008). For example, one weakness of the Gwangju Uprising was the limited
participation of one region in the movement, leading to a weak sense of importance of the protest
to the rest of the country (Kim 2011). A diverse participation by multiple regions, thus, makes
protest demands more likely to be met, indicating a higher rate of protest success (Yun 1997).
Finally, the fifth metric returns to the main concept in this thesis, which is the idea that
feelings of relative deprivation contribute the greatest to the probability of creating a protest
movement in general (Hypothesis 1) as well as to the success of movements (Hypothesis 2), both
of which have been elaborated on in chapter 2 of this thesis. Additionally, the precursive
qualities mentioned in the metrics are those outlined by Morrison (1971) in Section 3.1. One
hypothesis’ reasoning which relates to the fifth metric has not been evaluated at length yet,
which is Hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 3 mentions that while all forms (decremental, aspirational and
progressive) of relative deprivation as outlined by Gurr (1970) do produce a meaningful impact
on protest success, progressive deprivation leads to the most probability of protest success of the
three.
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Recall that progressive deprivation refers to constantly rising expectations or needs of the
people coupled with a steep decline in the capabilities of the government in power to deliver on
those expectations. This combination creates what Davies (1962) termed as the J-curve. The Jcurve depicts a larger gap between the needs of the constituents and the capabilities than
aspirational or decremental deprivation due to the sharp drop in government capabilities. In
progressive deprivation, the aforementioned gap is the widest among the three forms of relative
deprivation (Gurr 1970). Ultimately, relative deprivation is a theory based on the emotions of
deprival by protestors. For example, each of the four Korean protest cases mentioned in this
thesis began with an emotional catalyst which, when combined with pre-existing feelings of
deprivation caused the protestors to act. The April Revolution and the June Struggle ignited with
the discovery of the torture and death of a student by the government (Lee 2007). The Gwangju
Uprising began with the imprisonment of Gwangju-born politician Kim Dae-Jung (Kim 2011),
and the Candlelight Revolution originated with the government’s poor response to the sinking of
the Sewol Ferry in 2014 (Yap 2014). Noting the importance of feelings in protest movements, I
argue that as progressive deprivation produces the widest gap between expectations and
capabilities, these feelings of relative deprivation enable protest organizers to draw more people
into a successful protest movement.
Because the wide gap indicates the most powerful feelings of deprivation, this thesis
argues that protests are more likely to succeed when the relative deprivation materializes in the
form of progressive deprivation. Protests with a stronger emotional basis as well as a specific
goal are more successful, because protestors are more persistent in achieving their goals and less
likely to give up in the face of adversity (Yun 1997). Additionally, protests with a strong
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emotional basis have a greater influence on others to join in, which also contributes to the greater
probability of protest success (Wouter and Walgrave 2017).
4.1.1 Analyzing the Success of the Four Case Studies
This section of the thesis will address Hypothesis 2 (see Section 2.2). Prior to discussing
the overall success of each case study, this section will briefly outline the goals of each of the
four cases.
In the April Revolution (1960), the primary goal was to force the removal of Rhee SyngMan from office based on Rhee Syng-Man’s poor handling of the Korean War and generally
authoritarian tactics without the charisma needed to back them up (Hwang 2001). In the
Gwangju Uprising (1980), the main goal was to incite Chun Doo-Hwan’s government to release
Gwangju native and democratization figure Kim Dae-Jung from prison, where Kim Dae-Jung
was being kept for threatening the regime (Na 2003). In the June Struggle (1987), the primary
goal was to lead the government to creating an amendment that would decide the President by a
popular vote, as the failures of Chun Doo-Hwan generated support for a democracy(Shorrock
1988). In the Candlelight Revolution (2017), the main goal was to force the removal of Park
Geun-Hye from office after her corruption scandal involving the chaebols as well as her
negatively viewed reaction to the Sewol Ferry Sinking in 2014 (Kim 2020).
By applying each of the four cases to metrics for a successful protest movement defined
by this thesis, the metrics can be utilized to measure the relative level of success for each case
study. Analyzing the April Revolution (1960) through the first metric, because the protest’s goals
were agreed upon but were not defined, the metric is only partly satisfied. The goal was unified
as the protestors focused on their mutual dislike for Rhee Syng-Man’s rule. However, as the
protestors had no clear idea of what they wanted after Rhee’s removal occurred, the protestors’
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goals were not clearly defined. Looking at the second metric, only one aspect of this metric is
satisfied, as the protest’s goal was directly met without meaningful long-term effect. While the
protestors did succeed in removing Rhee Syng-Man, only a year later a different authoritarian
leader (Park Chung-Hee) came into power.
The third metric is unsatisfied as there was no clear, inclusive organization of the protest
by the groups involved. Since the April Revolution included little organization, primarily by
students, it was also not inclusive of multiple social groups/classes. The fourth metric is satisfied
as a meaningful portion of the population participated in the protest. The number of participants
in this protest is thought to be around 100,000, the third largest protest of among the four cases.
Additionally, the protest did eventually reach Seoul with the participation of Korea University
students. Finally, the fifth metric is not satisfied as the protest does not display conditions which
are defined as progressive deprivation and is considered to be an example of decremental
deprivation (see Section 3.3.1). Examining all five metrics, a few of the metrics are somewhat
met (Metrics 1 and 2), but only metric 4 is completely satisfied. Thus, this protest cannot be
considered successful by this thesis’ definition.
Analyzing the Gwangju Uprising (1980) using the first metric, because the protest’s goals
were defined but not agreed upon, the metric is only partly satisfied. In this case, goals were
clearly defined, which was to secure the release of Kim Dae-Jung. However, over time the
protest groups (Mulim and Haklim) disagreed over what tactics should be used to achieve these
goals. Looking at the second metric, neither aspect is satisfied as the protest’s goal was not
directly met and did not produce a meaningful effect. Kim Dae-Jung was not released until 1983,
while protestors faced massive violence by the government. No meaningful effect against the
regime was produced until 1987 when the June Struggle takes place. The third metric is also not
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met, as protest organization was not clear or inclusive. While groups did physically organize, the
two groups that formed (Mulim and Haklim) constantly disagreed on the substance of protest
such as protest tactics. Additionally, because only students primarily took part, organization was
not inclusive.
Looking at the fourth metric, a meaningful, diverse portion of the population did not take
part in the protest. Because the numbers of protestors are reported to be around 10,000, this
protest is the smallest of the four cases. Also, only one region (Gwangju) took part in the protest,
and it never reached Seoul. Examining the fifth metric, the Gwangju Uprising does meet the
conditions for general relative deprivation as well as progressive deprivation (see Section 3.3.2).
Combining each of the five metrics, because the Gwangju Uprising met only metric 5, it cannot
be considered successful by this thesis’ definition and is the least successful movement of the
four.
Examining the June Struggle (1987) using the first metric, because the protest’s goals
were clearly defined and agreed upon, the metric is satisfied. Protestors united under the
common goal of seeking free and fair elections, and multiple groups united under an umbrella
organization such as the UMMDU to achieve their goal. Looking at the second metric, the
primary goal of the protest was directly met, but arguably no meaningful effect was produced.
The protest did achieve the goal to secure free elections, as an election for President did take
place that same year. However, a meaningful effect was not produced in terms of
democratization, as Chun Doo-Hwan’s successor was still elected. Democratization did not
occur until 1998 with the election of Kim Dae-Jung (see Section 4). The third metric was also
satisfied, as the protest’s organization was clear and inclusive. Organization was clear as groups
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united under the UMMDU. Organization was also inclusive as this protest included not only
students but members of the working class.
Because a meaningful and diverse portion of the population participated in the protest,
the fourth metric is also satisfied. Roughly 240,000 people are reported to have attended, the
second largest movement among the four cases. The movement spread across 22 cities, including
Seoul. The fifth metric is satisfied as the June Struggle meets both the conditions for general
relative deprivation and progressive deprivation. Since four out of five metrics are satisfied, this
protest can almost be considered a complete success. However, although this protest did result in
democratic elections, a member of the authoritarian Hanahoe still won the presidency. Thus, by
the argument of this thesis, democratization was not achieved until 1998.
For the Candlelight Revolution (2017), the first metric is satisfied as goals were clearly
defined and agreed upon. Similar to the June Struggle, groups united under an umbrella
organization, the ECAPAR, who focused only on forcing Park’s resignation. The ECAPAR
created a united social media campaign involving over 1,500 other protest groups. The second
metric is additionally satisfied. The primary goal was met, as Park Geun-Hye (although she did
not resign) was impeached. This goal also produced a meaningful effect, as Park was not only
removed but also placed on trial and convicted as a result of bribery and corruption charges. This
demonstrates a commitment by the state to prevent future actions of corruption within the
Korean government, which had continued to be an issue until the Candlelight Revolution.
Looking at the third metric, organization was clear due to unity created by ECAPAR and its
umbrella groups. Organization was also inclusive as not only students and the working class but
also the middle class took part in the protest, demonstrating the ingrained nature of protest in
Korean society as a result of democratization.
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The fourth metric is also satisfied as a diverse, meaningful portion of the population took
part in the protest. At least 16 million people are thought to have attended, according to the
organizer’s claims, thus making this the largest protest by far. Nearly every region in Korea took
part in the protests in some way, with the largest protests happening in Seoul. The fifth metric is
satisfied as well, as the Candlelight Revolution meets both the conditions for general relative
deprivation and progressive deprivation. By this thesis’ definition, the Candlelight Revolution is
considered a complete success as five out of five metrics are satisfied. See Table 3 for a visual
depicting the relative successes of each case.
As the comparative successes of the four case studies are now explored within this thesis,
Hypotheses 1 and 2 have both been addressed. The next section of this thesis will thereby
address Hypothesis 3, which focuses on how the success of protest movements led to the
advancement of democratization within South Korea. A case study analysis will be performed by
applying the shifts in quantitative indicators of democratization to the previous argument
developed in this thesis regarding the success of each case study.
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4.2 Polity Project: An Overview
In order to quantify democratization, the dependent variable, this study will utilize the
Polity Project (from here on referred to as Polity) Series V (1800-2018) developed by Systemic
Peace. Polity Project scores countries based on the characteristics of the central regime in a
certain year, focusing on how that regime utilizes as well as places controls on its authority,
hence the term “authority trends.”
The score determined by Polity Project is based on a 21-point scale, which ranges from 10 (hereditary monarchy) to a +10 (consolidated democracy). These categories are also divided
into three categories reflecting autocracies (-10 to -6), anocracies (-5 to +5) and democracies (+6
to +10). An anocracy is essentially a “semi-democracy,” which includes both democratic and
authoritarian characteristics. The overall scores are composed of six indicator variables, which
are defined as follows:
1) XRREG refers to the regulation of chief executive recruitment, centering on the extent of
a country’s institutionalized, well-defined procedures for choosing the leader of said
country. XRREG is based on three categories: unregulated/forced seizures of power,
designational/transitional in which executives are designated by an elite body without
formal due process, and regulated transitions of executive power.
2) XRCOMP refers to the competitiveness of executive recruitment, focusing on the
presence or absence of competition and a way to advance oneself politically. XRCOMP
is also based on three categories: designated selection of an executive (usually referring
to hereditary succession), dual executives in which one is chosen by hereditary
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succession and one is chosen by competitive elections, and finally pure competitive
elections.
3) XROPEN refers to the openness of executive recruitment, meaning that every person in
the politically active population has the ability to become a chief executive by a
regulatory process. Four categories are used to determine this score: closed recruitment
(usually referring to hereditary succession), dual executive designation (both executives
are designed by an elite body), dual executive election (one executive is chosen by
election), and finally open recruitment (elections).
4) XCONST refers to the presence or absence of executive constraints. This variable
focuses on the extent of institutional constraints on the ability of the executive to make
decisions, and takes into account the role of “accountability groups” which can place
such limitations. This variable uses seven categories: unlimited authority, intermediate
category (this term denotes a “middling” categories between the preceding and
succeeding categories), slight to moderate limit on authority, intermediate category,
substantial limitations on executive authority, intermediate category, and executive parity
or subordination (meaning accountability groups are more powerful than the actual
executive).
5) PARREG refers to the regulation of political participation, and focuses on
institutionalized rules for how preferences are expressed. This variable includes five
categories: unregulated participation (fluid with no political organizations), multiple
identity where groups are somewhat stable, sectarian in which interests between political
groups are incompatible (often leads to factionalism), restricted participation and
regulated participation.
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6) PARCOMP refers to the competitiveness of participation, focusing on civil interaction
and civil society. This variable is coded on a five-category scale: repressed competition,
suppressed, factional, transitional (intermediate between factional and competitive), and
competitive.

4.3 Polity Project’s Authority Trend Report: Four Case Studies
This section will apply the scores provided by Polity Series V to the case studies of South
Korea and provide an analysis.
First, it can be observed from Figure 1 that from 1948 to 1959 the general Polity
remained stable, ranging from about -3 to -4. This period prior to 1960s’ Polity reflects the
anocratic nature of Rhee Syng-Man’s government. Rhee Syng-Man’s government is considered
anocratic rather than purely authoritarian because Rhee Syng-Man was not a hereditary monarch
and was technically chosen by an executive body of American military leaders, who selected him
for his upbringing in the American education system, strong anti-Communist stance and
perceived ability to be easily controlled by American officials (Koh 1993). Additionally,
executive constraints by the American government were present, because Rhee Syng-Man acted
as more of a figurehead than an actual executive. Figure 2 shows that the primary contributor to
this anocratic score is the component XROPEN, displaying Rhee Syng-Man’s appointment as
President not by the Korean people or even an elite Korean body, but an American body
claiming to make decisions on behalf of the Korean people (Hwang 2001). Another important
factor in this score is PARCOMP, which emulates the lack of equal participation in Korean civil
society at the time. In the period after the Korean War, most Koreans dealt with issues of pure
survival rather than focusing on politics or civil society due to the disastrous effect of the war on
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the Korean economy. Thus, the average Korean person was understandably not concerned with
political participation or building civil society (Koh 1993).
As a result, Korean elites who were not as affected by the war were able to manipulate
Korean politics to their benefit, allowing them to control the government over the general
Korean people. The saturation of elites into the public and the government paved the way for the
success of the chaebols during Park Chung-Hee’s presidency, an issue that still produces
detrimental effects to Korean democracy today (Han 2004). This effect can also be seen in the
rise of Chun Doo-Hwan’s Hanahoe group that dominated Korean politics in the 1980s (Moon
Rhyu 2011). Therefore, the destructive effects of the Korean War on the economy also affected
the political state of affairs in Korea, limiting chances for democratic participation and
supporting an anocratic regime.
In 1960 the Polity made a sharp rise to a score of 8, when the April Revolution took
place, and Rhee Syng-Man’s government lost its power. Looking at the Polity components, the
key factor in the Polity change is XCONST, which shifts from 2 to 7 in 1961. An XCONST of 7
refers to executive parity or subordination, in which groups outside of the executive become
more powerful than the actual executive. During the April Revolution, executive parity clearly
existed as primarily student groups were able to force out the President of South Korea and his
cabinet members out of the government (Koh 1993).
I argue that this executive parity was able to exist due to the lack of both traditional and
charismatic legitimacy. Traditional legitimacy was lacking due to the novelty of the office of the
Presidency, which prior to Rhee Syng-Man’s appointment had not existed. Charismatic
legitimacy was absent because of Rhee Syng-Man’s failure to appeal to the ordinary Korean
people-not only was he not appointed by Korean people or even an executive body of Korean
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elites, but he had spent most of his life in the US with American elites. Thus, he had little ability
to sympathize with most Korean citizens (Hwang 2001). As a result, student groups were able to
remove him and his government from office, reflecting a pillar of democracy in the ability to
remove a corrupt leader. Shortly after Rhee Syng-Man was removed, another authoritative
leader, Park Chung-Hee, came into power and remained President through the 1960s and 1970s
until his assassination in 1979. Thus, an autocratic backsliding event (a bold, black X) is marked
on Figure 1 after the April Revolution, referring to the “backwards” motion of declining
democratic trends in Korea at that time. Although a democratic trend did take place, it was
quickly reversed, hence the backsliding event.
Relating this autocratic backsliding event to the issue of protest success, Table 3 depicts
the April Revolution as mostly unsuccessful, satisfying only one of the five metrics (Metric 4)
for protest success and partly satisfying two metrics, Metrics 1 and 2 (see, Section 4.1.1). It is
also one of two case studies which is not considered an example of progressive deprivation.
Hypothesis 2 states that when progressive deprivation occurs, protest movements are more likely
to be successful. According to the argument of this thesis, the April Revolution’s pointed lack of
meaningful success can be considered evidence to support Hypothesis 2’s claims. Based on the
autocratic backsliding event shown by the shift in the Polity score and considering that the Polity
score is being used by this thesis to represent the dependent variable democratization, the April
Revolution could be considered a failure of democracy as a trend towards authoritarianism
flourished shortly after the event. However, while the April Revolution may have been a failure
of democracy in that Korea did not democratize until nearly thirty years later, this thesis argues it
along with the other two “unsuccessful” case studies (Gwangju Uprising and June Struggle) were
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marginal successes for democratization. This argument will be expanded upon in this thesis’
concluding remarks.
As this thesis has already discussed in Chapter 1, after Park Chung-Hee’s death in 1979
Chun Doo-Hwan and his Hanahoe group of military-backed supporters took power in 1980,
installing Chun Doo-Hwan as President. From Figure 1, it can be seen that throughout the late
1970s the Polity score remained strongly autocratic (specifically ranging between -8 and -9), thus
it was natural for Chun Doo-Hwan to continue the autocratic legacy Park Chung-Hee had left
behind (Han 2004). In 1980, the Gwangju Uprising took place after the imprisonment of Chun
Doo-Hwan’s political opponent Kim Dae-Jung. The Gwangju Uprising achieved relatively little
success in the long run (Table 3). However, it did achieve some successes for democratization in
the short run, as depicted by shifts in the overall Polity in Figure 2 (Shorrock 1988). After the
Gwangju Uprising took place, the Polity score shifted upward from -8 in 1980 to -5 in 1981
(depicting a slight shift towards democratic trends), and then remained at a score of -5 until
1987, when the June Struggle occurred.
Thus, the Gwangju Uprising’s short-term success was able to shift the authority trends of
the regime from an extremely solidified autocracy to an anocracy. Looking at Figure 2, the most
influential components of the Polity responsible for this score is XRCONST, and to a lesser
degree PARREG. In terms of XRCONST, in a similar manner to the scenario described during
the April Revolution in 1960, civil society groups such as the student activists were highly
influential during the Gwangju Uprising. In terms of PARREG, although its component score
shifted a lesser degree compared to XRCONST, PARREG’s score actually moved in the
opposite direction of XRCONST in that the score decreased. PARREG refers to how political
participation is regulated, and its score moved from 4 in 1980 to 3 from 1981-1986 (prior to June
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Struggle). A higher score refers to a greater level of regulation, and thus, a drop in this score is
not necessarily indicative of a lower level of democratic trends. In this case, a 4 refers to
restricted participation, while a score of 3 refers to sectarian participation where interests
between accountability groups are incompatible, relating to the concept of factionalism.
Factionalism was certainly present to a high degree during the Gwangju Uprising and was
arguably the primary factor in the movement’s lack of success as mentioned in Chapter 1. Two
primary groups, the Mulim and the Haklim, disagreed on what tactics were best to use in the
protest. Specifically, the Mulim focused more so on the need for the long-term development of
the movement and preached peaceful methods of protesting, while the Haklim preferred a more
direct, even violent strategy of protesting in order to achieve rapid development (Chung 2003).
This factionalism continued until after the success of the June Struggle.
Looking at the data compiled from our analysis in Table 3, the Gwangju Uprising was
clearly the least successful of the four cases, satisfying none of the five metrics for protest
success. Considering the brutality faced by protestors as a result of the authoritarian regime
during the movement (being termed a “massacre” today) and the way spreading any information
about the factual events of the protest was largely suppressed by the regime, it is clear that the
protest’s success was incredibly unlikely to occur even if protest organization or tactics had been
different. However, although this protest did not meet the definition of success as termed by the
five metrics, evidently it achieved some success regarding democratization as the Polity score
shifted upward from -8 to -5, reflecting a regime change from a strong autocracy to an anocracy.
While the regime did not shift to a fully democratic state, the Polity score reveals that the
sacrifices made at Gwangju led to slight (but present) movements towards a regime with more
democratic qualities.
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As mentioned in the previous section, prior to 1987 the Polity score throughout Chun
Doo-Hwan’s presidency remained at -5, reflecting a strong anocracy (scores between -5 and +5,
with lower numbers reflecting great authoritarian characteristics). In 1987 the year of the June
Struggle, the score drastically shifted to a score of +6 according to the trend report. Thus,
according to Polity, South Korea officially became a democracy in 1987. It should be noted that
scores for a democracy range from +6 to +10. Thus, a score of +6 expresses a somewhat weak
democracy.
Looking at the component report for the year 1987, every component increases to a score
of 6 (referring to a high degree of democratic traits); but this increase is only temporary. From
1988 until about 1998, nearly all of the component scores made a regression to a lower degree of
democratic characteristics. Analyzing scores in later years, the overall Polity also did not shift to
a strong democracy until 1998, with a score of +8. This is the same (and first) year that an
opposition candidate, Kim Dae-Jung, was democratically elected President. Examining the
component shifts from 1987 to 1988, the most influential factors were XRREG and XRCOMP.
Both components relate to chief executive recruitment, with the former designating the
regulation of how an executive is chosen and the latter designating how competitive the selection
process is. Chief executive recruitment was arguably the greatest observable change when
comparing before and after the June Struggle, as this movement reformed the electoral process to
decide on the President (Shorrock 1988).
However, while these elections were a step in the direction of democracy, the election
results did not reflect such a drastic change. Between 1987 and 1998, while democratic elections
did take place, the eventual Presidents were consistently from the same party (Yun 1997). Some
could argue that a score correlating with a strong democracy (+8-+10) should have originated in
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1993. Previous opposition candidate Kim Young-Sam became President in 1993, defeating
incumbent Roh Tae-Woo. However, in 1990 a merger occurred which combined Kim YoungSam and Roh Tae-Woo/Chun Doo-Hwan’s parties (Kim 1997). Considering the factor
XRCOMP, such a merger evidently made elections less competitive (prior to 1998).
The merger made Kim Young-Sam’s party gain the majority in the National Assembly,
but clearly damaged Kim Young-Sam’s supposed hopes for a democratic Korea considering the
actions of Roh and Chun during the Gwangju Uprising (Kim 1997). Additionally, although Kim
Young-Sam made challenging corruption a key issue on his political agenda, at the end of his
presidency a scandal occurred that was similar to Park Geun-Hye’s scandal in 2017 (Kim 2020).
The media discovered that Hanbo Steel company received great preference from the government,
mainly in the form of forcing banks to issue loans to the company under pressure from
politicians. Kim Young-Sam’s son was found to have been directly involved and sentenced to
three years in prison, and Kim Young-Sam’s involvement was thought to have been likely (Park
1998).
Thus, I would argue that the development of a strong democracy did not occur until 1998
with the election of Kim Dae-Jung, which is reflected in the Polity score. Kim Dae-Jung was
imprisoned by Chun and Roh’s governments in the 1980s. Yet, his influence grew to win Kim
Dae-Jung the Presidency over their Chun and Roh’s authoritarian party in 1998, and he never
chose to work together with the authoritarian party in order to garner political advantage as Kim
Young-Sam chose to do. Kim Dae-Jung’s election was more significant to the overall trend of
democratization in Korea, because he experienced a great deal of opposition from the primary
authoritarian party and was still able to become President. This accomplishment in the face of
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previous opposition means that Korea’s democratic process had developed to the point that
people like Kim Dae-Jung were able to succeed, thus reflecting stronger democracy (Kim 1997).
Beyond the issue of executive recruitment, examining the component PARCOMP it is
clear that political participation became less restricted, more competitive and generally viewed as
more important to citizens. PARCOMP (which ranges from 1 to 5, 5 being mostly democratic)
shifted from a consistent score of 2 in the early 1980s to a score of 4 after 1987, denoting
advance in civil society. Such a trend implies the immediate success of the beginning of the
democratic transition with the June Struggle (1987). Additionally, the later shifts towards a
stronger democracy in 1998 as mentioned earlier display the consolidation of democracy in
Korea during the post June Struggle era (Yun 1997).
Connecting the analysis of Polity Project to Hypothesis 3 in regards to the June Struggle,
while the June Struggle was not considered a full success, it did satisfy four out of five metrics
for protest success (see Table 3). The only metric it did not fully satisfy was Metric 2 in that the
goal of the protest movement was directly met but did not produce a meaningful effect. Above,
this thesis explains this argument in greater detail, and concludes that democratization in South
Korea did not occur until 1998 with the election of Kim Dae-Jung. Although the June Struggle
was not a complete success according to the metrics of this thesis, and it did not produce a
meaningful effect directly after its occurrence, it is clear that the June Struggle did contribute to
the eventual democratization of South Korea. The June Struggle achieved its goal of free
elections, leading citizens to expect greater rights and freedoms from the government and to
become more interested in political involvement (see Section 3.3.3). Thus, although the June
Struggle was not a fully successful protest movement, it was a highly important contribution to
Korean democratization and can still be considered in support of Hypothesis 3.
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The argument that full democratization in Korea officially occurred in 1998 is supported
by the shift in the Polity score in that year. From 1987 to 1997, the Polity remained at +6, but in
1998 shifted to +8, where it has remained since. The most significant aspects of this shift were in
the upward movement of XRREG and XRCOMP, which both involve the regulation and
competitiveness of chief executive recruitment. As opposition leader Kim Dae-Jung was elected
in 1998 fairly and without compromising with previous authoritarian leaders or groups, his
election was most conducive to democratization and led to the Polity shifting to reflect a strong
democracy with a score of +8. As this score remained since 1998, +8 was also the Polity during
the 2017 Candlelight Revolution. The strong, lasting democracy which such a score is
representative of is clearly shown in how the Candlelight Revolution were able to both achieve
its immediate goals and produce a meaningful democratic effect after its occurrence.
Considering that the Candlelight Revolution satisfy five out of five in the metrics for
protest success as defined by this thesis and are thus considered a fully successful protest
movement, along with the +8 score, this thesis’ case study analysis of this movement is clearly
supportive of Hypothesis 3. Additionally, the success of the Candlelight Revolution does not
purely indicate the increased effectiveness of protest movements in the post-democratic era
where movement are less limited by suppression from the government. The success of the
Candlelight Revolution also highlights the influence of prior movements of the 1960s and 1980s.
While pre-democratization protests were clearly less successful in achieving a meaningful
democratic effect during their time, their influence still permeates the modern protest culture
which has developed in Korea. The seemingly more minor successes of previous protest
movements eventually culminated into the full democratization of Korea in 1998, allowing for
protests like those in 2017 to achieve their goals in a non-violent, effective manner.
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4.3.1 Survey Data Analysis of Attitudes of Koreans regarding Democratization (1980-2020)
Looking at additional survey data from World Value Survey, evidence can also be found
to support the argument that the increased success of protest movements played a key role in the
democratization process of South Korea. When one is asked to define the term
“democratization,” a common response is that democratization allows people to have a greater
say in the decisions of the government that represents them. Another concept typically affiliated
with democratization is that people under a democracy have greater freedoms available to them,
such as freedom of speech. If one considers these two concepts as democratic values, these
values can be used in order to measure the level of democratization affecting the values system
of Koreans to support my argument. One question from World Value Survey asked Korean
respondents “If you had to choose, which one of the things on this card would you say is most
important?” The response options given were: “Maintaining order in the nation,” “Giving people
more say in important government decisions,” “Fighting rising prices,” and “Protecting freedom
of speech.”
In 1982, 13.2% of respondents chose “Giving people more say in important government
decisions” as their first choice, while 9.7% of respondents chose “Protecting freedom of speech”
as their first choice. In 1990, 14.5% of respondents chose “Giving people more say in important
government decisions” as their first choice, while 11% of respondents chose “Protecting freedom
of speech” as their first choice. Thus, there was a slight increase in the period directly after the
Gwangju Uprising and the timeframe after the June Struggle. In 2018, 23.3% of respondents
chose “Giving people more say in important government decisions” as their first choice, while
1.8% of respondents chose “Protecting freedom of speech” as their first choice. The percentage
of respondents who chose the former option nearly doubled since 1981-1984, but the percentage
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of respondents who chose the latter option clearly decreased. However, the latter option
decreasing in priority for the respondents does not necessarily indicate a loss of value in freedom
of speech. Rather, considering the amount of time that had passed since the democratic landmark
of Korean democratization, the June Struggle occurred, this thesis argues that Koreans at this
point in time (2017-2020) would already have felt that their freedom of speech was protected and
thus did not prioritize this value as much. Given that their rights were already protected, Koreans
would instead prioritize issues such as “Fighting rising prices,” the option which was chosen by
40.7% of respondents as their first choice. Thus, the shifts in responses for this survey question
indicate a tangible increase in democratization and democratic values from 1981-2020 in South
Korea, as is argued by this thesis.
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5

CONCLUSION AND APPLICATION TO FURTHER STUDY

Here, our original hypotheses will be restated:
1) Protest movements occur as a consequence of relative deprivation.
2) When progressive deprivation occurs, protest movements are more likely to be successful
(by the definition within this thesis).
3) Successful protest movements led to the overall greater success of democratization in
Korea.
The findings from the case study analysis clearly support the first hypothesis. Each
protest movement applied to some form of relative deprivation (see section 3.3), with the April
Revolution and Gwangju Uprising being considered examples of decremental deprivation and
the June Struggle and Candlelight Revolution being considered examples of progressive
deprivation. Feelings of relative deprivation, referring to the negative discrepancy between what
people (tangibly or intangibly) expect from the regime and what they actually receive clearly
existed in each case study, and served as the primary motivation for the development of the
discussed protest movements.
The findings from the case study analysis supported the claims made in the second
hypothesis. While the April Revolution and Gwangju Uprising were instances of decremental
deprivation and not progressive deprivation as mentioned in the second hypothesis, both were
also unsuccessful by the standards of this thesis, with the April Revolution satisfying one out of
five metrics and the Gwangju Uprising satisfying none of the metrics. Contrastingly, the June
Struggle and Candlelight Revolution were both examples of progressive deprivation and were
mostly successful by the standards of this thesis, with the June Struggle satisfying four out of
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five metrics and the Candlelight Revolution satisfying all five metrics. As the two mostly
successful protests were considered to be instances of progressive deprivation, and the two
mostly unsuccessful protests were considered instances of decremental deprivation (still relative
deprivation, but a different form of relative deprivation), the findings from the qualitative case
study analysis supported the second hypothesis.
The findings from the case study analysis and quantitative Polity Project data analysis
support the third hypothesis. As seen in Figure 1, from 1948 to 1959 the Polity was stable,
ranging from about -3 to -4, reflecting the anocratic nature of Rhee Syng-Man’s government.
The Polity rose to 8 in 1960 when the April Revolution took place and Rhee Syng-Man’s
government lost its power. Yet when Park Chung-Hee took power soon after an autocratic
backsliding event occurred in 1961, the score quickly decreased to -7. After the Gwangju
Uprising took place in 1980, the Polity score shifted upward from -8 in 1980 to -5 in 1981
(depicting a slight shift towards democratic trends), and then remained at a score of -5 until 1987
when the June Struggle took place. While both the April Revolution and Gwangju Uprising were
considered unsuccessful (satisfying one and none out of five metrics respectively) as individual
protest movements, the subsequent shifts in their Polity scores towards democratic trends
indicate that the April Revolution and Gwangju Uprising were successes for democratization, but
marginal successes in comparison to the success indicated by the Polity scores of the two more
recent protest case studies.
However, it should be noted that these findings are not intended to minimize or discount
the clear impact of the April Revolution and Gwangju Uprising on South Korea’s
democratization movement or Korean history as a whole. The sacrifices of those who
53

participated in these movements can be felt today with the clear success of Korean
democratization (look no further than the example of the Candlelight Revolution) and the
memorialization of the movements in South Korean history, pop culture, literature and public
events. Taking into account the marginal successes of these earlier movements, it may be
conducive to consider protest movements not as individual events, but instead as a larger
movement for democratization. For instance, a time series analysis on wider array of protest
movements in South Korea as well as other countries which have undergone democratization
could be performed to study shifts in democratization movement altogether in relation to protest
success. Additionally, I would be interested in looking into the role of these so-called
“unsuccessful” protest movements in a broader study examining how individually unsuccessful
protest movements can still make a valid contribution to the mission of democratization.
The findings from the case study analysis and the quantitative data analysis regarding the
two most recent protest movements, the June Struggle (1987) and the Candlelight Revolution
(2017) do support our third hypothesis. Before 1987 the Polity score throughout Chun DooHwan’s presidency remained at -5, reflecting a strong anocracy. In 1987, the score made a
dramatic shift to a score of +6, marking South Korea’s official transition to democracy. From
1987 to 1997, the Polity stayed at +6, but with Kim Dae-Jung’s election in 1998 the score shifted
to +8, which remains today. Thus, +8 was also the Polity score during the 2017 Candlelight
Revolution, reflecting the lasting success of democratization in South Korea since 1987. These
findings clearly support our third hypothesis, as the more recent protest movements were also the
most successful movements by the definition of this thesis, with the June Struggle satisfying four
metrics and the Candlelight Revolution satisfying five out of five metrics.
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Examining the application of this thesis to future works, I believe that a major
contribution of this thesis to the field of political science is the argument that the presence of a
revolutionary legacy within a society is a central contributor to the success of democratization
within said society. This longstanding revolutionary legacy in South Korea served as a major
source of motivation for protest development along the course of its democratization. Seeing
this, I would be interested in analyzing the concept of revolutionary legacies and political
legacies in general, and highlighting the application of this argument to other democratized or
non-democratized societies or states. I would be particularly interested in examining the
revolutionary legacies of other Asian and Southeast Asian states in relation to their processes of
political development.
To close this thesis, I will reiterate my initial reasoning for beginning this research. In an
effort to address and provide an empirical critique against prevalent Western scholarly analyses
of political and democratic development within East Asian states, I chose to study the successful
democratic transition of South Korea and the role of protest movements in this transition through
the lens of relative deprivation theory as posited by Gurr (1970). I sincerely hope that this
analysis promotes objective arguments which account for diverse cultural perspectives on
political development in future academic works on the subject of political development in East
Asia and will serve as a positive contribution to the study of political science as a whole.
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LIST OF TABLES

6.1 Table 1: Comparing Protest Movements in South Korea

Description

April Revolution, 1960

Gwangju Uprising, 1980

June Struggle, 1987

Candlelight Revolutions
2016-2017

Mass protests against
President Syngman-Rhee,
leads to resignation.

Mass protests against
President Chun Doo-Hwan
after arrest of Kim Dae-Jung
culminate in Gwangju
massacre.

National Assembly demands
amendment to choose the
President by popular vote.

Large-scale, peaceful street
protests carried out against
the Park Geun-Hye regime
after her corruption scandal
involving her aide using her
political position to obtain
illegal donations from
chaebols.

Discontent for Rhee rises:
corruption concerns, violent
suppression and uneven
development.

Many protestors are killed,
raped or beaten by military
forces deployed by Chun.

After the events of Gwangju
massacre and increased
hopes for democratization,
the populace joined protest
against the regime.

Actors

Primarily student-led, some
labor groups.

Primarily student-led, some
working class.

Primarily student-led, middle
class and labor groups.

Diverse base of protestors.

Alliances/Relationships
between protest groups

Low level of organization
between protestors.
No significant alliances
formed.

The debate between the
Mulim and Haklim created
strife between protestors.

Representatives from broad
social sectors unite a giant
alliance known as the NCDC

Nearly all sectors of populace
join.

Chun Doo-Hwan’s successor
Roh Tae-Woo yielded to

Park Geun-Hye is impeached
in 2017 and is arrested for

Alliances are only formed
within groups and not
between them.
Regime Reaction

Rhee steps down days after
protest.

Chun Doo-Hwan’s military
forces suppress protestors,
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Outcomes

Rhee flees for exile in the
US.
Second Republic of South
Korea adopts a parliamentary
system. Two years later, Park
Chung-Hee gains power in a
military coup.

leading to thousands of
deaths.

protest goals and issued the
June 29 Declaration.

corruption and bribery.

Legitimacy of the regime is
questioned by not only
students but general civilians
due to the brutality shown.

Large-scale democratic
reforms introduced, including
direct election of the
president. Opposition leaders
Kim Dae-Jung and Kim
Young-Sam fail to produce a
sole presidential candidate,
both are defeated by Roh
Tae-Woo.

The peaceful protests along
with the peaceful removal of
a leader show the success of
the democratic transition in
Korea.
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6.2 Table 2: Morrison’s Structural Conditions in Relation to the Four Case Studies
Structural Condition

Application to April
Revolution (1960)

Application to Gwangju
Massacre (1980)

Application to June Struggle
(1987)

Application to Candlelight
Revolution (2017)

Large sector of the
population affected by
deprivation

Dramatic increase of higher
education institutes created a
larger sector of the educated
population.

Increase in education &
economic success allowed
the populace to focus outside
survival (after the Korean
War).

Unpopularity and stagnated
growth during Chun DooHwan’s regime led to
increased frustrations.

Majority of the population
developed a negative
perception towards Park after
scandal.

Combined with institutional
Confucian ideology, the
success of and growth during
the Park regime (1963-1979)
allows for an even greater
degree of interaction.

As civil organizations grew,
societal interaction increased
to an even higher level.

In the post-democratic era,
civil society thrived as there
were no limitations on free
speech and meeting.

Allows more people to
recognize their deprivation.

Community with a high
degree of interaction

The Confucian emphasis on
sense of community in Korea
was amplified when
education and civil society
grew during this period.

Gave the population more
time to focus on other affairs
like politics.

Social media gave rise to a
free platform for people in
various areas to develop
movements in pursuit of
social justice.

High degree of class
consciousness

More education led to a
greater degree of class
consciousness as people are
more aware of their societal
standing.

More education combined
with greater economic
standing led to greater class
consciousness and people
could dedicate more time and
effort to change.

Student efforts to educate the
working class on their sociopolitical standing were highly
successful, bringing larger
sectors of the population into
democratization activities.

Media freedom is no longer
limited and the rise of
investigative media and
social media movements
brought more interest to
social justice pursuits.

Stratification system in
society

Confucian ideas emphasize a
stratified society and
generally lower socioeconomic mobility.

Widespread economic
growth meant that previously
rich and powerful
conglomerates became even

The dominance of the
military and the regime over
the populace created a more
obvious stratification system.

Rapid economic growth
created stratified economic
classes, creating a strong
divide between the lower,
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The students had the insight
due to their education to
recognize it (see condition
#3).

more influential and the
system more stratified.

middle and upper classes.

Voluntary association within
society (civil society)

Higher education institutes as
well as the preexisting
Confucian tradition of a
strong civil society creates a
strong basis of societal
interaction.

The increase in economic
fortune gives people more
time to participate in
voluntary associations.

Civil society grew
immensely during this period
(1980-1987) with the
creation of the UMMDU and
NCDC.

As freedom of speech and
assembly expands, protestors
were free to openly take part
in civil society.

Some degree of efficacy

The Korean revolutionary
legacy against Japanese
colonial rule gave students
the knowledge of the success
of protest movements, giving
a sentiment of efficacy.

The Korean revolutionary
legacy of the April
Revolution and Korean
independence from Japan
provided the students with a
sense of efficacy for success.

Increased power and
organization of civil society
and prominent opposition
leaders gave protestors a
greater sense of efficacy.

The legacy of protest
movements and the role of
protests in achieving
democratization gave the
populace efficacy in
participation.
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6.3 Table 3: Success of the Four Case Studies based on the Five Metrics

Protest
Metric
(Satisfied/
Partly
Satisfied/
Unsatisfied)

Goals are
defined and
agreed upon

Primary goal is
directly met and
produces
meaningful effect

Clear, inclusive
organization of
the protest by
groups involved

Meaningful
geographic portion
of the population
participates in the
protest (does it reach
Seoul?)

Protest displays
conditions
defined as
progressive
deprivation

How many metrics
were met + is the
protest deemed
successful?

April
Revolution
(1960)

Partly
Satisfied

Partly Satisfied

Unsatisfied

Satisfied

Unsatisfied

Not Successful (1/5)

Gwangju
Uprising
(1980)

Partly
Satisfied

Unsatisfied

Unsatisfied

Unsatisfied

Unsatisfied

Not Successful (0/5)

June
Struggle
(1987)

Satisfied

Partly Satisfied

Satisfied

Satisfied

Satisfied

Not Successful (4/5)

Candlelight
Revolution
(2017)

Satisfied

Satisfied

Satisfied

Satisfied

Satisfied

Successful (5/5)
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LIST OF FIGURES

7.1 Figure 1: Authority Trends in South Korea from 1948-2018
7.2 Key for Figure 1:
Polity Project’s Regime
Conditions

Explanation of the
Condition’s Meaning

Denotation of Condition

Corresponding Polity
Score

Autocratic backsliding
event

Eventual decline in the
quality of democracy,
essentially the opposite
direction of
democratization.

Bold black diamond

POL changes by five
points or greater toward
more autocratic
characteristics that
forcibly overthrows the
established regime

Executive auto-coup or
autogolpe event

Also known as a selfcoup, refers to an event
where a nation’s leader

Bold red triangle

POL changes by five
points or greater, with the
change initiated by a

dissolves the legislature
and grants themselves
great power, usually
unlawfully.
Polity Score

Based on the authority
trends of the regime in a
particular year.

ruling executive

Solid blue line

21-point scale, ranges
from -10 (hereditary
monarchy) to a +10
(consolidated democracy).
21-point scale is divided
into three categories:
• autocracies (-10
to -6)
• anocracies (-5 to
+5)
• democracies (+6
to +10)

7.3 Figure 2: Polity Project Score Component Trends from 1948-2018
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7.4 Key for Figure 2
Components of Polity Score

Component Definition

XXREG

Regulation of chief executive recruitment

XRCOMP

Competitiveness of executive recruitment

XROPEN

Openness of executive recruitment

XCONST

Presence or absence of executive constraints

PARREG

Regulation of political participation

PARCOMP

Competitiveness of political participation

7.5 Figure 3: Polity Project Score Component Trends: xxreg, xrcomp, xropen
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7.6 Figure 4: Polity Project Score Component Trends: xconst, parreg, parcomp
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